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PARTIES TO THIS APPEAL
The parties to this appeal and to the trial court proceedings are listed in the
case caption.
TURISDICTION
This is an appeal from an order of the Third Judicial District Court, Hon.
Judith S. H. Atherton, granting summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee
David L. McCann, M.D., and dismissing Plaintiff Robert Joseph's complaint against
him. Originally filed in the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 782-2(3) (j) (2002), this appeal was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2002).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
and
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court correctly grant summary judgment, dismissing

Plaintiff Joseph's medical malpractice claim against Dr. McCann, upon the ground
that Dr. McCann, who examined Plaintiff as an independent examiner retained by
Salt Lake City, owed no duty of care toward Plaintiff?
2.

Did the trial court correctly grant summary judgment on the alternative

ground that Plaintiffs medical malpractice claim was barred by the two-year
limitations period contained in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (2002)?
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Appellate review of a grant of summary judgment is basically identical to that
of the trial court: facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing
summary judgment. The trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed without
deference. The question whether disputed issues of material fact exist, and therefore
require trial, is a question of law upon which this Court accords no deference to the
trial court. See, e.g., Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332,1334 (Utah 1977).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, AND RULES
The standard for granting summary judgment, set forth in Utah R. Civ. P.
56(c), states: ' T h e judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
The pertinent provisions of Utah's Health Care Malpractice Act, setting forth
the limitations period for initiating a claim of malpractice, found in Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-144 (2002), state as follows:
(1)
No malpractice against a health care provider may be
brought unless it is commenced within two years after the
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through use of reasonable
diligence should have discovered the injury, whichever first
occurs,..., except that:...
(b)
In an action where it is alleged that the patient
has been prevented from discovering misconduct on the
-2-

part of the health care provider because that health care
provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal
the alleged misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless
commenced within one year after the plaintiff or patient
discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence,
should have discovered the fraudulent concealment,
whichever first occurs.
The texts of any other pertinent constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules are set
forth in the argument sections of this Brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
By complaint filed in October 2003, Plaintiff Robert Joseph leveled a claim of
"Medical Malpractice" against Dr. McCann, a psychiatrist who had performed an
independent medical evaluation (IME) upon Plaintiff, to evaluate Plaintiffs fitness
for duty as a Salt Lake City police officer. According to Plaintiff, Dr. McCann's IME
was conducted improperly, yielding a negative evaluation that led to termination
of Plaintiffs employment. Within his claim of medical malpractice, Plaintiff also
accused Dr. McCann of "libel, slander, conspiracy, negligence, fraud, and
racketeering .... (R. 3-12, copied in Appendix A of this Brief, emphasis added.)
After discovery, Dr. McCann moved for summary judgment on two,
alternative grounds: (1) that as an independent medical evaluator, he had no
physician-patient relationship with Plaintiff, and hence, no duty of care to support
a claim of malpractice; and (2) that even if a malpractice action could lie against Dr.
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McCann, Plaintiff's complaint was time-barred under the two-year limitations
period of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. (R. 85.)
Upon briefing and argument, the trial court granted summary judgment on
both grounds. (R. 553-54, Br. of Appellant Attachment A.) Plaintiff then filed a
motion to alter or amend the trial court's judgment, which motion was denied. (R.
567-68; R. 579, Br. of Appellant Attachment B.) This appeal followed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Plaintiff - Robert Joseph was employed by Salt Lake City (SLC) as a Police

Officer in 1997. (R. 85.)
2.

Shooting Incident - In March 1999, Plaintiff was involved in an incident

wherein he shot and injured a motorist while acting as a SLC Police Officer ("Shooting
Incident"). (R. 4, 85.)
3.

Suspension of Plaintiff - As a result of the Shooting Incident, Plaintiff was

suspended, and then terminated, by SLC as a police officer. (R. 123,125.)
4.

Reinstatement of Plaintiff - In January 2000, SLC reinstated Plaintiff as

a police officer. As part of this reinstatement, Plaintiff was required to submit to an
IME. (R.125.)
5.

David L. McCann - Dr. McCann is a medical doctor and has a specialty

in the field of Psychiatry. In January 2000, Dr. McCann was retained by SLC to
perform an IME of Plaintiff.

Assistant City Attorney Lyn Creswell supplied
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personnel records of Plaintiff for Dr. McCann's review, and also wrote a letter to Dr.
McCann (the "Creswell letter") expressing concerns that Plaintiff had "appeared
threatening" in his behavior. (R. 4,7,17; R. 193, copied in Appendix B of this Brief.)
6.

IME/IME Report - Dr. McCann commenced his IME of Plaintiff in early

February, 2000 - this included a review of personnel records and related materials
furnished to Dr. McCann by SLC. Dr. McCann also had psychological testing done
and performed a psychiatric interview of Plaintiff on February 3,2000. At the time
of the IME interview, Plaintiff signed a written "Statement of Conditions for
Independent Medical Evaluation, which included an acknowledgment that Dr.
McCann's role was to provide his assessment to SLC and "not treatment" to
Plaintiff. (R. 128, Br. of Appellant Attachment E.) Plaintiff Joseph also admitted, in
his deposition, that "I knew I wasn't going [to Dr. McCann] for treatment." (R. 86,
103-04). Dr. McCann completed his IME Report on February 28,2000 and provided
it to SLC. (R.17.)
7.

Consultations About IME - A copy of Dr. McCann's IME Report was

provided to Plaintiff and his attorney on or about March 14,2000. Through March
and April, 2000, Plaintiff and his counsel consulted two psychologists concerning
the IME Report; a third psychologist was consulted by mid-year.
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Those

consultations caused Plaintiff to believe that Dr. McCann was "in error" in his IME.
(R. 105-15.)
8.

Plaintiffs Termination by Salt Lake City Corporation - Based in part

upon Dr. McCann's IME Report, SLC terminated Plaintiff as a Police Officer on
March 31,2000. (R. 9,17.) See also Joseph v. SLC Civil Service Comm'n, 2002 UT App.
254 t 2-3, 53 P.3d 11,13-14 (copied in Br. of Appellant Attachment C).
9.

Appeal of Termination Decision - On April 5, 2000, Plaintiff, through

counsel, appealed his termination to the SLC Civil Service Commission
("Commission"). As part of the Request for Appeal, Plaintiff contended that Dr.
McCann was at fault in the IME. Plaintiff alleged in part as follows:
Dr. McCann did not conduct a complete and competent
evaluation,... The evaluation is incomplete and inadequate.
(Emphasis added.) The paragraph criticizing Dr. McCann's evaluation contained
specific allegations of deficiencies, consistent with the psychologist consultations as
described by Plaintiff. (R. 130-33, copied in Appendix C of this Brief.)
10.

Dismissal of Appeal - Plaintiff failed to comply with discovery requests

from SLC while his case was pending before the Commission. Accordingly, on
April 9,2001, the Commission dismissed Plaintiffs appeal of his termination. Joseph
v. SLC Civil Service Comm'n, 2002 UT App. 254 | 3-5,53 P.3d at 14.
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11.

Affirmation of Termination/Dismissal - The action of the Commission

in dismissing Plaintiffs appeal of the termination was affirmed by the Utah Court
of Appeals in Joseph v. SLC Civil Service Comm'n, supra.
12.

Initiation of Medical Malpractice Claim - On April 23, 2003, Plaintiff

initiated his claim against Dr. McCann for medical malpractice by filing a Notice of
Intent to Commence Legal Action and contemporaneously filing a Request for
Prelitigation Screening Panel, in accordance with the provisions of the Utah
Healthcare Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-1 (2002). (R. 14, "Time Line,"
copied in Appendix D of this Brief.)
13. Civil Complaint Filed - Subsequently, on October 14,2003, Plaintiff filed
his civil complaint against Dr. McCann, accusing him of "Medical Malpractice"
based on conduct which allegedly constituted "libel, slander, conspiracy, negligence,
fraud, and racketeering ...." (R. 3-12.)
14.

Grant of Summary Judgment - After discovery in the malpractice case,

on April 25, 2005, the trial court granted Dr. McCann's motion for summary
judgment, entering an order of dismissal with prejudice. (R. 553-54.) Plaintiff
moved to alter or amend that judgment, which motion was denied on September 19,
2005. (R.579.)
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The trial court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs complaint upon the

ground that no physician-patient relationship existed between Dr. McCann and
Plaintiff Joseph. Under Utah law, the absence of such relationship defeats an
allegation of a duty owed toward the Plaintiff. Statutory provisions in the Utah
Health Care Malpractice Act also establish that Dr. McCann was not a care provider
for Plaintiff, and therefore, cannot be held liable as such. Case law from Utah and
other jurisdictions addressing the relationship of an independent examiner to a
plaintiff, and the policy considerations supporting such case law, also amply
support the trial court's judgment in this case.
2.

The trial court also correctly concluded, alternatively, that Plaintiffs

medical malpractice action against Dr. McCann was time-barred under the two-year
limitations period of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. Plaintiff discovered
evidence to support his malpractice action no later than April 5, 2000, but did not
commence that action until more than three years later, on April 23,2003. Plaintiffs
bid to extend the limitations period, based upon "fraudulent concealment/' also
fails: Plaintiff alleged fraud in his untimely complaint, and his discovery of evidence
purporting to support that allegation, during litigation of that complaint, did not
retroactively extend the limitations period.
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ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
The Trial Court Correctly Held that Dr. McCann, as an
Independent Medical Examiner Employed by Salt Lake
City, had No Duty of Care toward Plaintiff that Could
Support a Medical Malpractice Claim
"To establish negligence... a plaintiff must first establish a duty of care owed
by defendant to plaintiff.... The issue of whether a duty exists is entirely a question
of law to be determined by the court/7 Ferre v. State, 784 P.2d 149,151 (Utah 1989)
(quoted and followed in Smith v. Frandsen, 94 P.3d 919, 923-24 (Utah 2004)). No such
duty existed in this case between Dr. McCann and Plaintiff.
A.

Utah Case Law.

As applied to medical malpractice, when a physician has no physician-patient
relationship with an individual, the physician owes no duty to that individual, and
a malpractice lawsuit fails as a matter of law. In Wilcox v. Salt Lake City Corp., 26
Utah 2d 78,484 P.2d 1200 (1971), plaintiff sought to sue physicians who contracted
with the City to read x-rays for health screening, and mis-read plaintiffs x-ray,
missing signs of a tubercular condition.

The Utah Supreme Court affirmed

summary judgment in favor of the physicians: "since the doctor's duty was to the
City, they had no doctor-patient relationship" with the plaintiff. 484 P.2d at 1201.
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Just as the physicians in Wilcox had no duty of care to the x-rayed individuals,
Dr. McCann had no duty of care toward Plaintiff Joseph. Like the physicians in
Wilcox, Dr. McCann was retained by SLC, not by the examinee, Plaintiff Joseph. The
"Statement of Conditions for Independent Medical Examination" (R. 128, Br. of
Appellant Attachment E), signed by Plaintiff Joseph, made this explicit: "It is Dr.
McCann's role to provide evaluation and not treatment."

The "Statement of

Conditions" further clarified that Dr. McCann would release his evaluation to the
City, and not to Plaintiff or his attorney.
B.

Utah Statutory

Authority.

A conclusion that Dr. McCann had no duty toward Plaintiff Joseph is further
supported by the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, which defines "health care" as
"any act or treatment performed or furnished, or which should have been
performed or furnished, by any health care provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient
during the patient's medical care, treatment, or confinement." Utah Code Ann. § 7814-3(10) (Supp. 2005). As an independent examiner, Dr. McCann was not providing
medical care or treatment to or on behalf of Plaintiff Joseph. He was performing a
service for SLC.
Nor was Plaintiff a "patient" of Dr. McCann under the Malpractice Act,
despite his misidentification as such in the "Statement of Conditions." "'Patient7
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means a person who is under the care of a health care provider, under a contract,
express or implied/7 Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(22) (Supp. 2005). Although the
"Statement of Conditions" twice mis-labeled Plaintiff Joseph as a "patient," it
otherwise made plain, as quoted earlier, that Plaintiff was being evaluated, not
treated, by Dr. McCann. Furthermore, Plaintiff Joseph admitted: "I knew I wasn't
going [to Dr. McCann] for treatment." (R. 104.) Once again, the contract for service
was not between Dr. McCann and Plaintiff Joseph; it was between Dr. McCann and
Salt Lake City. Because Dr. McCann was not under contract, expressed or implied,
to provide healthcare to Plaintiff, there was no physician-patient relationship, and
he owed no duty of care toward Plaintiff.
C.

Case Law from Other Jurisdictions.

Cases from other jurisdictions are in accord with the above analysis. See, e.g.,
Martinez v. Lewis, 969 P.2d 213 (Colo. 1998) (En Banc) (independent examiner
engaged by insurer had no physician-patient relationship and owed no duty to
plaintiff-insured); Hafner v. Beck, 185 Ariz. 389,916 P.2d 1105 (Ct. App. 1995) (duty
ran from the independent medical examiner to the insurance carrier who retained
him - not to the examinee); Keene v. Wiggins, 69 Cal. App.3d 308 (1977) (physician
retained by employer to conduct IME of an injured employee had a duty of care and
preparation of the report to employer - not to the employee); Rogers v. Hovath, 65
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Mich. App. 644, 237 N.W.2d 595 (1975) (physician retained by insurance carrier to
conduct an IME had no physician/patient relationship with plaintiff who lost
insurance benefits based upon the results of the IME); Violandi v. City of New York,
184 A.D.2d 364, 584 N.Y.S.3d 842 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (physician/patient
relationship did not exist when the examination is conducted on behalf of an
employer); Tomko v. Marks, 412 Pa. Super. 54, 602 A.2d 890 (1992) (plaintiff did not
have a valid medical malpractice claim when the IME was conducted solely at the
request of plaintiffs employer). The court in Martinez v. Lewis, supra, noted "that
this conclusion is in accord with virtually every other court to consider this issue.
969P.2dat219.
D.

Policy Considerations.

The policy reasons behind this rule were outlined by the Arizona Court of
Appeals in Hafner v. Beck, supra. In Hafner, a psychologist performed an IME of
plaintiff at the request of a workers compensation carrier. The Arizona Court
affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of the psychologist:
A medical malpractice suit such as this will lie only when
there was a doctor/patient relationship creating a duty to
act for the patient's benefit. ... Because no such
doctor/patient relationship existed between Beck and
Hafner, the trial court correctly ruled that Beck owed no
duty to Hafner under these circumstances.
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The Hafner court went on to quote with approval from Davis v. Tirrell, 443 N.Y.S.2d
136 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) as follows:
To permit such an action would make it impossible to find
any expert witness willing to risk a lawsuit based on his
testimony as to his opinions and conclusions before any
tribunal. And such cause of action if permitted would
lead to an endless stream of litigation ....
Hafner, 916 P.2d at 1108 (quoting Davis, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 140).
In light of the foregoing analysis, authority, and policy considerations, the trial
court correctly held that Dr. McCann "owed no legal duty to plaintiff from which
a legal action could be commenced[.]" (R. 554.) On this point, the trial court's
judgment, and its order dismissing Plaintiffs complaint, should be affirmed.
POINT TWO
The Trial Court Correctly Held that Plaintiffs Claim of
Medical Malpractice, Filed More than Two Years after
Learning the Basis for Such Claim, was Barred by the
Limitations Period of the Utah Health Care Malpractice
Act.
As explained in Point One, Plaintiff has no medical malpractice claim against
Dr. McCann, because Dr. McCann owed no duty of care to Plaintiff. But even if such
duty existed, the trial court correctly concluded, alternatively, that Plaintiffs claims
were barred by the limitations period specified in the Utah Health Care Malpractice
Act.

-13-

A.

No Claim Within Two Years of Discovering Legal Injury.

The limitations period of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (2002) provides, in
pertinent part:
(1) No malpractice action against a health care provider
may be brought unless it is commenced within two years
after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through use of
reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury,
whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four years after
the date of the alleged act, omission, neglect or
occurrence,...
The statute of limitations in a malpractice action begins to run when "an injured
person knows or should know he has suffered a legal injury." Foil v. Bollinger, 601
P.2d 144,147 (Utah 1979). A "legal injury" exists when the "injured person knew
or should have known that he had sustained an injury and that the injury was
caused by negligent action." Id. at 148.
In this case, Plaintiff knew of Dr. McCann's alleged malpractice and that this
had caused him to be injured (terminated), i.e. "legal injury," no later than April 5,
2000, when he filed his Request for Appeal Hearing with the SLC Civil Service
Commission. (R. 130-33, Appendix C of this Brief.) In that Request, Plaintiff
specifically alleged that "Dr. McCann did not conduct a complete and competent
evaluation," and made specific allegations of deficiencies in Dr. McCann's IME and
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IME report. He did not commence his malpractice claim against Dr. McCann until
April 23, 2003, when he filed his Notice of Intent to Commence Legal Action.
Plaintiff acknowledged that by March 14, 2000, he and his attorney were
provided with a copy of Dr. McCann's IME report, which opined that Plaintiff was
not suitable for duty as a police officer. (R. 105-06.) Plaintiff and counsel then
promptly contacted other experts to review Dr. McCann's IME report. As a result
of these consultations, Plaintiff formed the opinion that Dr. McCann was at fault in
his IME. Plaintiff testified in part as follows:
Q.

So that [consultations with psychologists] led you
to believe that Dr. McCann was in error in his
evaluation?

A.

Yes.

(R. 117.)
Furthermore, based upon the possibility that Plaintiff did not obtain
consultation with a third psychologist until mid-year 2000, the trial court correctly
determined that Plaintiff's malpractice action was untimely commenced: "I am in
agreement with the defendant that at the outside the statute began running June 15th
of 2000, and terminated June 15th of 2002 ...." (R. 590 p. 23.)
As can be seen from the foregoing, Plaintiff waited well over two years from
the time he learned of his "legal injury," until he initiated his malpractice action
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against Dr. McCann on April 23, 2003. The trial court correctly held that his claim
was time barred.1
B.

No Exception for Fraudulent Concealment.

Plaintiff alleges that Dr. McCann "fraudulently] concealed]77 the "true
nature" of his contract with Salt Lake City to perform an IME. (Br. of Appellant p.
18-22.) Plaintiff thereby attempts to invoke a statutory exception to the normal twoyear medical malpractice claim limitations period:
(b) In an action where it is alleged that the patient has
been prevented from discovering misconduct on the part
of the health care provider because that health care
provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal
the alleged misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless
commenced within one year after the plaintiff or patient
discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence,
should have discovered the fraudulent concealment,
whichever first occurs.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(l)(b) (2002).
Plaintiffs allegation of fraudulent concealment is based upon the letter to Dr.
McCann from assistant Salt Lake City Attorney Lyn Creswell (Appendix B of this
1

Plaintiff had previously served Dr. McCann with a Notice of Intent to
Commence Action dated September 23,2002, and then a second Notice of Intent
dated February 9, 2003. However, no Request for Prelitigation Review was filed
within 60 days after either of those Notices, which invalidated them pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(2)(a) (2002). However, even the earlier of those two
notices was tardy under the two-year limitations period. (R. 14, Appendix D of
this Brief.)
-16-

Brief), written shortly before the February 2000 IME. In that letter, Creswell
expressed particular concerns about Plaintiffs behavior, and asked Dr. McCann to
contact him about his IME. The Creswell letter was disclosed during discovery in
this lawsuit, on January 25,2004. (R. 590 p. 18; Br. of Appellant p. 14.)
Read in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Creswell letter does not show
that the fundamental elements of his malpractice action - injury (termination),
caused by alleged negligence ("legal injury"), were concealed from him. Again,
Plaintiff knew the facts supporting those elements as early as March 14, 2000, and
no later than mid-June, 2000. His subsequent discovery of the Creswell letter, after
the untimely, April 23, 2003 initiation of his malpractice claim, cannot change the
date when he acquired knowledge of those operative facts, and therefore cannot
retroactively extend the time to file his malpractice claim.
The Creswell letter, according to Plaintiff, provides "evidence to support the
claim of fraud" that Plaintiff alleged in his untimely complaint. However, Plaintiff
had already made allegations of "fraud" and "conspiracy" in his Complaint For
example, Plaintiff alleged that the IME was arranged by SLC "with the negative
finding of unfitness planned beforehand." (Complaint f 39.) He alleged that the
final IME report was "changed" at the behest of a SLC official. (Complaint f 40.) He
alleged that Dr. McCann "misrepresented himself to Plaintiff as being an
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independent medical examiner/' and thereby "gained Plaintiff's confidence during
the evaluation by deception." (Complaint f 48.) Further, he alleged that Dr.
McCann "knowingly participated in the City's conspired scheme" to terminate
Plaintiff's employment.

(Complaint f 50.) Having done nothing more than

(arguably) support fraud allegations that plaintiff had made in his complaint, the
Creswell letter does not operate to make those allegations timely under the two-year
limitations period of § 78-14-4(1), nor under the "fraudulent concealment" exception
of subsection 78-14-4(1)(b).
Put another way, Plaintiff's claim that Dr. McCann "deliberately concealed the
origins of his malpractice" (Br. of Appellant p. 20), which origins were purportedly
revealed in the Creswell letter, does not aid him. It is knowledge of the basic
elements of the claim - injury caused by negligence or other fault, which Plaintiff
possessed by early to mid-2000, that triggers or starts the time running. See Floyd v.
Western Surgical Associates, 773 P.2d 401, 404 (Utah App. 1989); Schurman v.
Shingleton, 26 P.3d 227, 231 (Utah 2001).
Finally, under Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(16) (Supp. 2005), a "malpractice
action against a health care provider" includes "any action against a health care
provider ...." (emphasis added). In his complaint, Plaintiff Joseph did not allege a
separate claim of fraud against Dr. McCann. Instead, such claim was subsumed
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within his malpractice claim. But even if the fraud claim had been separately
alleged, it was still subject to the two-year limitations period of § 78-14-4(1). See
Floyd, supra., at 404. Thus neither making that claim, nor subsequently discovering
supporting evidence for the claim in the Creswell letter, operated to extend that
limitations period.
CONCLUSION
Dr. McCann had no duty of care toward Plaintiff upon which a malpractice
claim could be based. Additionally, even if a malpractice claim were permissible,
Plaintiff failed to timely initiate such claim. For either or both of these reasons, the
decision of the trial court, granting summary judgment in favor of Dr. McCann,
should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this t ^ day of April, 2006
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.

J. ANTHONY EY
KEVIN MUto-T
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the ( Q day of April, 2006, two true
and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee was mailed, first class, postage
pre-paid to the following:
D. Bruce Oliver
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
Suite 210
180 South 300 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490
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• O.Bruce Oliver #5120
Attorney for Plaintiff
180 South 300 West, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490
Telephone: (801) 328-8888
Fax:(801)595-0300
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT L. JOSEPH, an individual,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DAVID L. McCANN, M.D., F.A.P.A., an
individual,
Defendant.
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COMPLAINT
And Jury Demand
(Medical Malpractice)
CivilNo. 01092
Judge

d t ?

6

J]MjL<~t&~^~

]

Plaintiff, Robert L. Joseph, by and through counsel, D. Bruce Oliver, comes now
and for his claim in controversy against the above-named defendant, complains and alleges as
follows:
JURISDICTION and VENUE.
1.

All of the relevant conduct of the parties occurred in the State of Utah, or were

initiated within the State of Utah, or were finalized within the State of Utah.
2.
attorney fees.

This is an action for damages in excess of $10,000.00, exclusive of costs and

3.

All conduct complained of herein occurred in Salt Lake County, State of Utah,

(hereinafter "the incident") and that this Court is the proper Court to bring this action. Original
jurisdiction is vested in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4,1953, as amended, and
venue is proper to bring this action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-13-5,1953, as amended.
4.

Plaintiff Joseph's medical malpractice claims are brought pursuant to Utah Code

Ann. § 78-14-1 et seq., 1953, as amended.
PARTIES.
5.

Robert L. Joseph (hereinafter, the "Plaintiff Joseph" or "Plaintiff), is an

individual citizen of the United States and resides in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
6.

Based upon information and belief, Plaintiff states the defendant individual,

David L. McCann, M.D. F.A.P.A. (hereinafter, the "Defendant McCann" or "Defendant") is a
citizen of the United States, and was at the time relevant to the events complained of acting as a
physician or health care provider in the Salt Lake City Area, as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 7814-3(12), 1953, as amended.
7.

Based upon information and belief, Plaintiff Joseph states the Defendant is a

physician contract employee for the Salt Lake City Corporation providing professional
psychological evaluations to another.
NATURE OF THE CASE.
8.

Plaintiff Joseph was involved in a police-involved-shooting-incident on March 26,

1999, while employed at the Salt Lake City police department ("SLCPD") and acting under color
of authority as a police officer. During the shooting incident, the plaintiff was injured having
been hit and thrown from a speeding vehicle.
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9.

On or about March 31,1999, Plaintiff Joseph was cleared of the shooting by the

State of Utah's Crime Lab ("Crime Lab"); the Crime Lab concluded that Plaintiff Joseph fired
his weapon in "self-defense" and that Plaintiff Joseph was a "victim" of an aggravated assault
which predicated the shooting.
10.

In spite of the Crime Lab clearance, intending to make an example out of the

Plaintiff, the City procured the criminal prosecution of Plaintiff Joseph alleging that Plaintiff
Joseph had perpetrator an aggravated assault upon his assailant, vice versa of what the Crime Lab
concluded.
11.

The prosecution was not procured with the intent to bring an offender to justice.

12.

Pending the criminal charges, Plaintiff Joseph was terminated from the SLCPD.

13.

On or about April 19, 1999, the Salt Lake District Attorney's Office filed criminal

charges against Plaintiff Joseph and he was arrested.
14.

During the pendency of the prosecution, the SLCPD and District Attorney's

Office made a series of slanderous and libelous statements concerning Plaintiff Joseph. The
statements were made intending to appease the public and win over the public's confidence in the
SLCPD's handling of police-involved-shootings.
15.

When the truth was disclosed to Ernie Jones, the DA's prosecutor assigned to the

case, on or about July 7, 1999; thereafter, Mr. Jones agreed to the dismissal of the action.
16.

At the time of the dismissal of on or about November 23, 1999, Judge Burton

apologized to Plaintiff Joseph claiming the charges never should have been filed.
17.

As the prevailing party, immediately following the dismissal, Plaintiff Joseph's

attorney, Loni Deland, conducted his own press conference on Plaintiff Joseph's behalf.
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18.

The press corps left the conference and sought the City's response. Being caught

unaware of the dismissal or of the press conference, the City was embarrassed.
19.

The press conference was in the context of the criminal case and was privileged.

20.

Plaintiff Joseph claimed to have an actionable lawsuit against the City for

malicious prosecution.
21.

In the face of all the controversy, Plaintiff Joseph was reinstated to duty on

January 4,2000.
22.

On January 5, 2000, the Plaintiff Joseph met with Chief Connole, who on one

hand welcomed Plaintiff Joseph back to the department. Then on the other hand "ordered"
Plaintiff Joseph to submit to a fitness for duty evaluation with Defendant McCann.
23.

During the meeting, Chief Connole expressed that the order was "posturing" by

the City's attorneys (the City's risk management), and he urged the Plaintiff to settle his claims
against the City and not to take the shooting matter to the Civil Service.
24.

In an effort to further posture the City's position, on or about January 18, 2000,

the City's risk manager contacted Richard Shepherd seeking a letter excusing the District
Attorney for terminating its prosecution and claiming the City could proceed with its own
administrative actions against the Plaintiff. The letter was prepared and delivered that same date.
25.

Then on January 25,2000, the Plaintiff met with David Greer, the Union

President at the behest of risk management.
26.

The plaintiff was informed that the City refused to cover the plaintiffs defense

costs, also a risk management decision.
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27.

Unbeknownst to David Greer, the meeting was tape recorded by Plaintiff Joseph

who received a warning in advance of the meeting. However, the recording was later discovered
by Mr. Greer when the recording devise fell out of the plaintiffs pocket.
28.

Disagreeing with Mr. Greer and his offensive demeanor, Plaintiff Joseph

terminated the meeting, while maintaining his own composure and professionalism.
29.

Contrary to the information preserved in the tape recording, Mr. Greer reported to

Defendant McCann that Plaintiff Joseph had an anger fit.
30.

On or about February 3,2000, the Plaintiff reported to Defendant McCann for his

fitness for duty evaluation. The evaluation lasted less than 2 Vi hours with only an hour of
meaningful examination due to Plaintiffs apparent reluctance to open up.
31.

The examination was based on a clinical interview with Plaintiff Joseph, a clinical

information inventory, a mental status examination, a psychological testing, and a limited review
of medical records. The defendant also possessed some performance evaluations and letters from
Plaintiff Joseph's employer produced in 1998 through February 2000.
32.

The City's risk management office selectively provided only prejudicial material,

intentionally withholding the majority of Plaintiff s file from the doctor.
33.

In the examination, the Defendant addressed David Greer's allegations of

Plaintiffs so-called "anger fit," and discussed Plaintiffs lawsuit claims against the City
concerning the March 26, 1999 shooting and subsequent criminal prosecution.
34.

The Plaintiff denied the allegations concerning the anger fit and offered his tape

recording for the doctor to review. The doctor refused to accept the tape without an explanation.
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35.

The Plaintiff tape-recorded Defendant McCann's evaluation as well and admitted

recording the evaluation when asked.
36.

When Plaintiff admitted recording it, the doctor abruptly terminated the

evaluation, Defendant McCann abruptly terminated the evaluation and it was not reopened nor
delegated to another health care provider for its completion.
37.

The evaluation consisted of insufficient information to conclude the diagnosis

concluded by the Defendant. In order to adequately evaluate and diagnose the Plaintiff, the
doctor is required to document and enduring and chronic pattern or inflexible personality traits
and dysfunctional interactions consistent over a broad range of personal and social situations.
38.

An in-depth review did not occur in this case, Mr. Greer knew of Plaintiff Joseph

for a relatively short period of time and the documents provided did not include information
outside of the 1998-2000 period of employment. Demonstrated long-standing, continuing
personality problems is necessary for Dr. McCann's diagnoses in this matter.
39.

The evaluation was at the behest of the City with the negative finding of unfitness

planned beforehand. However, the Defendant believed he was immune from liability for his
conduct believing no duty to Plaintiff Joseph was owed. Defendant insists that the Plaintiffs
grievance is with the City alone.
40.

At the request of the City, Defendant McCann prepared a report and it was

completed on February 28, 2000. Before the final report was prepared, Defendant McCann
changed his initial evaluation after speaking to risk management's Martha Stonebrook.
41.

The February 28, 2000 report is evidence of City's corrupt persuasion over Dr.

McCann in violation of 18 U.S.C § 1512.
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42. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1512 it is illegal for anyone to corruptly persuade another
person, or attempt to do so, or engages in misleading conduct towards another person with the
intent to cause or induce any person to (1) withhold testimony, or withhold a record, document,
or other object, from an official proceeding; or (2) alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object
with the intent to impair the objects's integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding.
43.

Contrary to the ADA Guidelines, no other reasonable accommodations were

recommended or offered.
44.

Relying on altered February 28, 2000 report, the City terminated Plaintiff Joseph

from duty. The termination become effective March 31,2000.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Medical Malpractice)
45.

Paragraphs 1 through 44 are incorporated herein by this reference.

46.

A physician or health care provider has a duty to exercise the same degree of

learning, care and skill possessed by others in good standing practicing in the same medical field.
47.

In the performance of his physician or health care provider duties, the defendant

breached his duties in the following manner:
(A).

He failed to adequately examine the Plaintiff;

(B).

He failed to timely and appropriately assess, diagnose and or offer
treatment, if necessary, to Plaintiff Joseph-recommending termination is
beyond the scope of a health care provider's role;

(C).

He failed to obtain other medical assistance when Plaintiff Joseph's tape
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recorder fell out of his pocket in order to complete the examination;
(D),

He failed to timely secure the necessary medical consultations for Plaintiff
Joseph to complete the examination process;

(E).

He failed to timely recommend medical care and treatment for Plaintiff
Joseph, if appropriate; and

(F).

He failed to otherwise obtain or maintain proper medical treatment and
diagnostic services for Plaintiff Joseph on February 3, 2000 and continuing
thereafter.

48.

The Defendant did not act objectively and misrepresented himself to Plaintiff as

being an independent medical examiner. The Defendant gained Plaintiffs confidence during the
evaluation by his deception.
49.

Plaintiffs confidence was gained through Defendant's fraudulent statements and

assurances of honesty of intentions and absence of malice.
50.

In reality, the Defendant knowingly participated in the City's conspired scheme to

deprive Plaintiff Joseph of his employment. Defendant's role was voluntary and willful
believing he was immune from liability. The defendant was wrong; he is required to exercise the
same degree of learning, care and skill possessed by other in good standing practicing in the same
medical field.
51.

The Defendant's acts and omissions were willful in that the Defendant recklessly

disregarded the Plaintiff and his legal rights.
52.

The Defendant acted in a tortuous manner within the meaning of Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-14-3 (32), 1953, as amended. His legal wrongs include libel, slander, conspiracy,
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negligence, fraud, and racketeering within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (for obstructing
justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512).
53.

As a direct and proximate result of the aforesaid conduct, Plaintiff Joseph suffered

severe economic losses including to property due to his retaliatory termination, to his special
damage in a reasonable sum for loss income, front and back pay, and benefits (medical, dental,
retirement, etc).
54.

As a direct and proximate result of the aforesaid conduct, Plaintiff Joseph suffered

nonecomonic losses and should be compensated generally for pain, suffering and inconvenience
in the sum provided for in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-7.1, 1953, as amended.
55.

As a direct and proximate result of the aforesaid conduct, Plaintiff Joseph is

entitled to punitive damages pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1, 1953, as amended and Utah
Code Ann. § 78-14-7.1(4), 1953, as amended.
56.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56, 1953, as amended, and Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-14-7.5, 1953, as amended., the Plaintiff retained the services of an attorney to bring this
action. The Defendant should be ordered to reimburse Plaintiffs reasonable and necessary
expenses.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Joseph demands a trial by jury and asks for judgment
against the Defendant for the above-named claims, as follows:
1.

For an award of damages for economic losses for wages and benefits as are

reasonable in the premises;
2.

For an award of damages for noneconomic losses as are reasonable in the
Page 9

premises;
3.

For an award of damages for punitive damages as are reasonable in the premises;

4.

For an award of attorney's fees and costs as are reasonable in the premises; and

5.

For such other and further relief as the court deems just and proper in the

premises.
Dated 30th day of September, 2003.

Plaintiffs Address:
1156 East Lost Eden Drive
Sandy, Utah 84094

D. BRUCE OLIVER
Attorney for Plaintiff
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31 January 2000
CONFIDENTIAL
David McCann
4190 South Highland Drive
Suite 102
Salt Laice City, Utah 8412*
Re: Evaluation of Robert Joseph
DearDr McCann.
Encloscc" are relevant personnel records for Police Officer Robert "Rob" Jos^:\
Salt Lake City emplcvee Officei Joseph is scheduled for an evaluation with you m :-. tew
days
The City nas employed Officer Joseph since 1997.
Officer Joseph was released from his employment in July 1999, and then
reinstated m January 2000 (See attached letters.) Since his reirstatement I have received
several reports that Officer loseph has expressed anger, and appeared threatening to
other Police Department employes. Several City employees have expressed concern
about Officer Joseph's threatening behavior The City is concerned about Officer
Joseph's fitness to perform has duties as a police officer, and we axe concerned for the
safety cf OUT employees. Upon the completion of > our evaluation Police Chisf Mac
Connole and myself would like to meet with you to discuss your recommendations.
I ask that, when complete, your written evaluation of Officer Joseph be sent
duectly *o me
Please le: me know if "here is anything else we can provide you. My di-ect line is
535-7772

Respectfully,

<£
Lyn Creswell
assistant City Attorney

4 » 1 S O U T H S ^ A T t ZtUZZ*'.

» O O M S v * «AVT U i C f C > ^ U l A r l fl4* I *

ft-

-

Af»

TabC

REQUEST FOR APPEAL HEARING BEFORE
THE SALT LAKE CITY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Rob Joseph
Name of Applicant

Chief A. M. "Mac" Cannole
Person who took action being appealed

1156 East Lost Eden Drive
Address (Street)

Salt Lake City Police Department
Department, if applicable

Sandv, Utah 84094
City, State, Zip Code

March 31, 2000
Date of Action

(801)571-3098/
Phone: Home / Work
J. Bruce Reading
Appellate will be represented by
SCALLEY & READING. P.C.. 261 East 300 South. Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Address: Street, City, State, Zip
What is the action that is being appealed:
Termination of Employment
Please provide the facts regarding your appeal: (Attach additional pages, if necessary):
Officer Rob Joseph's employment with SLPD was terminated on March 31, 2000
because of a psychological evaluation finding him unfit for duty. Based upon that finding, Chief
Cannole claimed that Officer Joseph is incapable of performing his duties as a police officer.
This appeal follows shortly after the appeal of Officer Joseph's suspension of 20 days
from the SLPD force. Officer Joseph was fired following the shooting, but was reinstated with a
20-day suspension. The shooting incident occurred when Officer Joseph stopped a suspect who
was speeding and driving under the influence of alcohol. Officer Joseph fired at the suspect after
the suspect placed his vehicle in reverse causing the car door to strike Officer Joseph and carry
lim backward. Officer Joseph fired his gun while on the vehicle, while being thrown from the
/ehicle as he fell to the pavement.
After this incident, Officer Joseph was interviewed by Michele Myers, and LCSW, and
bund fit to continue as a police officer.
Officer Joseph was criminally charged with aggravated assault by the Salt Lake County
)istrict Attorney on April 23, 1999. On November 23, 1999, the judge in the case dismissed the

criminal action when the District Attorney agreed that Officer Joseph's Motion to Dismiss was
well taken and decide not to oppose the motion.
Following his reinstatement, Officer Joseph underwent an evaluation as to his fitness to
perform his duties. Officer Joseph has no knowledge of what issues were to be involved in the
evaluation because he did not receive a copy of the instructions to the psychiatrist as was
required by policy. Officer Joseph was interviewed by Dr. David L. McCann, a psychiatrist for
the Department, to determine his fitness for duty. Officer Joseph was asked many questions
during his interview with Dr. McCann regarding his court case, the incident in question and the
police department's policies, but not about his mental and emotional state at the time of the
shooting or any time thereafter. When speaking about Officer Joseph's actions at a union
meeting, Officer Joseph said he had recorded the meeting and asked if Dr. McCann wanted to
hear the tape to determine if he had acted in the manner alleged. Dr. McCann declined to hear
the tape. Dr. McCann then asked if Officer Joseph was recording their conversation. When
Officer Joseph told Dr. McCann that he was recording the conversation, Dr. McCann reacted
negatively. Officer Joseph was later brought in for more testing, but was not interviewed again.
Dr. McCann issued a report finding Officer Joseph unfit for duty.
Officer Joseph and his counsel met with Chief Cannole to discuss the issues of his
termination of his employment on March 14, 2000; however, Officer Joseph was terminated on
March 31, 2000.
Dr. McCann did not conduct a complete and competent evaluation. First, Dr. McCann
did not receive a full employment file for Officer Joseph in that he only reviewed Officer
Joseph's first two quarterly performance evaluations, and not the three more recent evaluations.
There is also a missing commendation letter. Second, in his evaluation, Dr. McCann appears to
give great weight to Union President David Greer's recitation of the events of a union meeting of
January 25, 2000. Officer Joseph had tape recorded the meeting, but Dr. McCann did not listen
to the recording. Dr. McCann did not speak with other individuals attending the meeting. Third,
Dr. McCann felt it necessary to talk to Union President Greer about one incident, but not to
Officer Joseph's current supervisor Sgt. Scott White about Officer Joseph's overall performance
following his reinstatement. Fourth, in the evaluation, the only portion of the evaluation which is
in bold type sets forth the fact that Officer Joseph tape recorded the interview with Dr. McCann.
Based upon the fact that Dr. McCann reacted negatively during the interview when he discovered
it was being recorded and then emphasized it in his evaluation leads to the issue of possible bias
on the part of Dr. McCann. Fifth, Dr. McCann states in the evaluation that an Axis II personality
disorder is the basis for his finding that Officer Joseph is unfit for duty. Such a personality
disorder is usually diagnosed early in life and is diagnosable in early adolescence. Prior
evaluations, including the extensive testing prior to employment with the police department, did
not detect such a disorder. Dr. McCann's analysis misses or does not address the Axis IV
psychosocial stressors of being fired, betrayed by the union and charged by his peers with a
felony. The analysis does not address those stressors and the short-term nature of any resulting
behavior from those stressors. The evaluation is incomplete and inadequate.
If, in fact, Officer Joseph's fitness for duty is in question and sustained, it is inappropriate
for SLPD to fire him rather than to employ some other remedy. SLPD is at least partially

responsible by its actions for Officer Joseph's predicament. Officer Joseph was involved in a
shooting, was criminally charged, was arrested and led to jail in front of his peers, was the target
of negative media publicity, was called a liar by the department, had the criminal action
dismissed immediately following the acquittal of another officer criminally charged in a separate
incident, and now the department is washing its hands of Officer Joseph because it now says he
is unfit for duty. SLPD has assisted other officers with problems without resorting to
termination. Officer Joseph's actions have been reasonable under the circumstances;
consequently termination of his employment is contrary to SLPD's policy.
Please list any witnesses you will have testify:
Name

Street

City/ State/Zip

Telephooe

Rob Joseph
Yolanda Ruis-Martinez
Dr. David L. McCann
Dr. Leslie M. Cooper
H. Michele Myers
Sgt. Scott White
Office Michael Hill
Officer Bruce Evans
Officer Matt Larsen
Officer Washington
Jeff Rowley

1156 E. Lost Eden Dr.
SL Police Department
4190 Highland Drive
5635 Waterbury Way. MC-202
670 East 3900 South, Suite 105
SL Police Department
SL Police Department
SL Police Department
SL Police Department
SL Police Department
SLC Corp. Law Dept.

Sandy, UT
Salt Lake City, UT
Salt Lake City, UT
Salt Lake City, UT
Murray, UT
Salt Lake City, UT
Salt Lake City, UT
Salt Lake City, UT
Salt Lake City, UT
Salt Lake City, UT
Salt Lake City, UT

571-3098
799-3000
272-9205
278-0200
261-4006
799-3000
799-3000
799-3000
799-3000
799-3000
535-7788

Officer Joseph may also call an expert as yet unidentified to critique the evaluation and/or
provide an evaluation of Officer Joseph's fitness for duty.
What records and other information do you request from the person who took the action
which resulted in this appeal?
A copy of all correspondence between SLPD and Dr. McCann;
A copy of the report stating Officer Joseph was unfit for duty;
A copy of Dr. McCann's notes;
A copy of Officer Joseph's personnel file; and
Copies of records relating to Officer Joseph's being found unfit for duty.
What actions do you want the Salt Lake City Civil Service Commission to take?
Reinstate Officer Joseph with full back pay and benefits or, in the alternative, reinstate
Officer Joseph following efforts to bring Officer Joseph to a position of fitness for duty provided
and paid for by Salt Lake City Police Department.

I hereby request a hearing before the Salt Lake City Civil Service Commission.

SignSroVof App^lant^

°~

fjsfm
Date
Submit this document to the Secretary of the Salt Lake City Civil Service Commission, 451
South State Street, Room 115, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Robert L. Jose

Tl
Mar 14, 2000 to
„ Jun 15, 2000
Plaintiff Consults
Three Experts

Jan 2000

Apr 2000

Jul 2000

Oct 2000

JUL
Feb 28, 2000
IME Report

LJ

Mar 14, 2000
IME Report
to Plaintiff
Mar 31, 2000
Plaintiff Terminated
Apr 5, 2000
Plaintiff Appeals Termination

Jan 2001

Apr 2001

Jul 2001

Oct 2001

David L. McCann, M.D.

Apr 23, 2003
Legal Action Started

002

Apr 2002

Jul 2002

J

Oct 2002

L

Apr 2003

Jan 2003

Jul 2003

L
Sep 25, 2002
Plaintiff Files First Notice of
Intent to Commence Action
Jan 9, 2003
Plaintiff Files Second Notice
to Commence Legal Action
Apr 23,2003
Plaintiff Files Third Notice of
Intent to Commence Action

Oct 2003

